The leaders discussed practical steps to further strengthen the Uzbekistan–US strategic partnership and expand mutually beneficial cooperation. Particular attention was given to promoting business projects in priority sectors and significantly increasing bilateral trade.
Trade turnover between the two countries grew by 15% in 2024, reflecting steady progress in recent years. The portfolio of joint projects spans civil aviation, mineral resources, the electrical industry, energy, agriculture, digital technologies, finance, innovation, and education.
The two sides also highlighted the importance of upcoming bilateral meetings with leading US companies and organizations this month, aimed at establishing long-term and sustainable partnerships.
In addition to economic ties, Mirziyoyev and Trump discussed cooperation in the field of security, with a focus on combating terrorism, extremism, and illegal migration.
They also welcomed the expansion of cultural and humanitarian exchanges. Branches of US universities continue to operate successfully in Tashkent, and the Uzbek national football team is preparing to take part for the first time in the World Cup in the United States next year. President Trump wished the team success in the tournament.
The leaders also exchanged views on strengthening regional cooperation within the C5+1 framework, which brings together the United States and the five Central Asian countries.
President Mirziyoyev extended an invitation to Donald Trump to pay an official visit to Uzbekistan at a convenient time.
In January–July 2025 (7M25), the United States ranked as Uzbekistan's 12th largest trading partner. Bilateral trade turnover stood at $509.5mn, marking a 9% decline compared to the same period in 2024 ($558.9mn)
Despite the year-on-year drop, trade volumes remain nearly 59% higher than in 2023 ($321.6mn), highlighting sustained growth over the past two years.
The SCO has often been described as a paper tiger, unable to effectively counter resilient Western institutions. Yet the real issue according to Eldaniz Gusseinov, a columnist for Daryo and a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies, lies elsewhere: the SCO does not aim to position itself as an integration bloc but rather as a club of states that share its core principles: respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; equality; mutual benefit; non-interference in internal affairs; and the non-use or threat of force as the foundation of “sustainable development of international relations.”
The expansion of partnerships is reinforced by the growth of resilient infrastructure. As these links deepen, the SCO gradually broadens cooperation, even if not strictly within the organization itself. Its instruments, such as regular meetings, provide a platform for member states to build new coalitions. The initiative to advance the international transport corridor “Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” for example, received an institutional framework at the first SCO Transport Forum in 2023.Photo: Capacity of the international transport Corridor (ITC) “Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan”, instructional framework of the ITC was laid on the sidelines of the first SCO Transport Forum in 2023
The backbone of SCO development is transport and energy infrastructure, with security serving as its protective shell. At maritime frontiers, most members face both logistical challenges and U.S. tariff threats. Russia’s energy ties with the West continue to erode, as the EU shifts toward American LNG. China, meanwhile, has sought to reduce its dependence on seaborne raw material supplies, as seen in its reduced copper scrap imports from the United States during tariff disputes.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan cast the SCO as a practical platform for Eurasian connectivity, security, and modernization. Uzbekistan pushed institutional upgrades and Global South outreach; proposed a trade-facilitation pact and new cooperation tools (energy consortium, critical-materials center, venture finance, business e-portal); called for a nuclear-safety declaration; linked the CKU railway to a future Trans-Afghan corridor; and urged reviving the SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group.
Kazakhstan emphasized the “Shanghai Spirit,” collective action against terrorism, extremism, cybercrime, and narcotics, humanitarian/technical support for Afghanistan, and closer SCO–CICA ties. Astana backed a SCO Development Bank, proposed an SCO Investment Projects Office at the AIFC, advanced North–South, East–West, Trans-Caspian, and “Trans-Altai” corridors, and launched a tech/green track (SCO AI forums; a Water Issues Center). Together they framed the SCO’s evolution from “paper tiger” to convening hub for coalition-building around infrastructure, trade, security, and applied technology.
These dynamics show that intra-continental connectivity is becoming the SCO’s main priority, which also raises the importance of regional security. For years, the lack of interest in continental projects slowed SCO development, but today the situation is changing. Central Asia has become a key driver thanks to its geography and balanced diplomacy, anchoring infrastructure initiatives launched before and during SCO summits. This is evident in deepening Russia–China cooperation and India’s growing presence in continental Eurasia amid conflicts with Washington over oil imports.Photo: China and India were the main destinations for Russian energy exports in July 2025, and despite the threat of tariffs, the trend is likely to continue growing.
Eurasian energy and transport integration at the 2025 SCO summit
The September 2025 summit marked a turning point in Eurasia’s energy and economic policy. China and Russia signed a legally binding memorandum to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, linking Western Siberian gas fields to China through Mongolia. With a planned capacity of 50bn cubic meters per year, the project will far exceed the existing Power of Siberia pipeline.
Photo: Map from Global LNG Hub illustrates proposed gas pipeline of the Power of Siberia 2
For Moscow, the pipeline secures a new major export market after losing access to European consumers. For Beijing, it provides a stable, long-term source of energy in an era of geopolitical risks and import diversification. China also announced expanded cooperation in renewable energy with Russia and other regional states, alongside his call to establish a SCO Development Bank as soon as possible to finance projects through grants and loans.
These moves reinforced the rapid growth of Russia’s oil trade with China and India, establishing the SCO’s energy partnership as a shield against Western sanctions. Pricing and purchase volumes under Power of Siberia 2 remain unresolved, yet the signing itself strengthened Moscow and Beijing’s role as leaders of Eurasian energy integration.
India’s economic shift
India’s strategy also reached a critical point. In August 2025, Washington imposed 50% tariffs on a wide range of Indian exports, from textiles to chemicals, in response to continued purchases of Russian oil. The tariffs sharply reduced India’s access to the U.S. market, threatening up to a 70% collapse in key export sectors.
New Delhi responded by accelerating its Eurasian pivot. Russia, Central Asia, and the Eurasian Economic Union emerged as alternative markets and energy partners. India sped up free trade negotiations, backed the International North–South Transport Corridor and the Chabahar port project, and strengthened energy ties with Moscow.
Rejecting U.S. tariffs as unjustified, Indian leaders reaffirmed their course of strategic autonomy. Sanctions and tariffs thus acted as a catalyst for building new hubs of energy and transport in Eurasia, where China, Russia, and India are gradually shaping alternative power centers less dependent on U.S. and EU markets.
Central Asia’s dual role
Central Asia lies at the heart of these transformations. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, SCO summits in Dushanbe, Samarkand, New Delhi, and Astana have underlined the region’s importance. Alongside these gatherings, SCO expansion accelerated: India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran’s accession process began in 2021, and Belarus became a full member in 2024. Earlier, Mongolia had become the first observer in 2004, followed by India, Pakistan, and Iran the next year.
From a geographic standpoint, Central Asia is the SCO’s core. Yet from an economic perspective, the SCO has also become the core of Central Asia, channeling trade and investment flows. In 2024 the four Central Asian members (excluding Turkmenistan) recorded $252.84bn in total trade, of which $134.60bn (53.2%) was with SCO partners based on the International Trade Center data. The structure is asymmetric: 38.3% of exports go to SCO markets, while 66.6% of imports come from them. Put simply, the SCO dominates what Central Asia buys but not what it sells.
China and Russia drive this system. Central Asia sends about 14.5% of its exports to China and 12.7% to Russia, while intra-regional exports account for just 9.4%. On the import side, China and Russia dominate machinery, consumer goods, and intermediate inputs, while intra-regional imports make up only 6.9%. Roughly 45% of total Central Asian trade is with non-Central Asian SCO members, and only 8% is intra-regional.
National patterns differ. Kazakhstan’s imports are dominated by SCO partners (61.7%), especially Russia and China. Its exports remain oriented outside the SCO, with 63% going elsewhere, nearly half to the EU in the form of crude oil. Investment trends are rising: SCO-linked FDI into Kazakhstan reached 31% in 2024, almost entirely from Russia and China. Uzbekistan’s SCO trade rose from $12.9bn to $32.5bn between 2017 and 2024, with imports increasingly SCO-driven and nearly half of FDI and credit inflows coming from SCO members. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most SCO-dependent, with 70–75% of their total trade linked to SCO partners and investment flows mirroring these patterns.
Two conclusions stand out. First, SCO expansion has broadened geography, but the operative economics still rely on China and Russia, leaving intra-Central Asian trade modest. Second, SCO platforms increasingly shape investment, not just trade, with project pipelines and financing channels tied to SCO initiatives. For Central Asia, this is both an asset and a constraint: reliable suppliers and finance on one hand, but concentration risks and commodity dependence on the other.
Ghosting the SCO: West Skips the Parade, Sweats the Photo
Western capitals answered the Tianjin SCO summit and Beijing’s 80th Victory Day with a coordinated diplomatic cold shoulder and critical messaging. Most leaders stayed away, with only a few exceptions such as Slovakia’s Robert Fico, while governments moved to discourage participation: Japan urged allies not to attend and Taiwan threatened penalties for those who did, accusing Beijing of historical revisionism.
Western media and analysts cast the optics, especially the image of Xi, Putin, Kim, and Pezeshkian together, as an “axis of upheaval” aimed at the U.S.-led order, and European security voices warned the display reinforced Moscow’s claim that it can endure because it has powerful friends. The collective absence signaled a refusal to legitimize what many in the West view as an explicitly anti-Western coalition.
In Washington the summit triggered immediate political backlash and a broader strategic rethink. President Trump publicly rebuked Prime Minister Modi over Russian oil purchases, Treasury voices amplified criticism, and figures across the spectrum, including Gavin Newsom and John Bolton, argued that tariff-heavy policies were pushing India closer to China and Russia.
The administration tightened pressure on New Delhi over sanctions compliance even as critics pointed to a paradox, since U.S. tariffs and other unilateral measures, singled out in the summit’s language, may be accelerating non-Western alignment. Policy circles rallied around friend-shoring and control of chokepoints in finance, supply chains, and technology, with scenarios ranging from managed transactionalism to harder bifurcation or crisis-driven polarization. The prevailing view is that the unipolar moment is ending and the United States must adapt to a more complex multipolar order where even democratic partners exercise strategic autonomy.
Conclusion
The SCO’s recent evolution shows both promise and limits. It has become a framework for Eurasian energy and transport integration, reinforced by Russia–China pipeline projects, India’s Eurasian pivot, and Central Asia’s bridging role. Yet the experience of Iran demonstrates the shortcomings, so Asia Times.
Iran joined the SCO in 2023 hoping regional finance would ease its banking isolation, but by 2025 these expectations remain unmet. The bloc still lacks shared financial systems, leaving Iran dependent on the Chinese yuan rather than a balanced currency basket. China has avoided major investments, focusing instead on Central Asia and Pakistan, where projects like CPEC receive strong backing. Iran’s North–South Corridor lags behind better-funded routes such as the Middle Corridor, leaving Tehran with little more than symbolic political legitimacy.
This shows that the SCO still has a long road ahead — yet dismissing it as a mere paper tiger would be a serious mistake.
UNICEF highlights urgent needs of children after a powerful 6.0-magnitude earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan August 31, with its epicentre near Jalalabad in Nangarhar province. Early reports indicate that the earthquake has killed over 2,200 people and injured thousands, causing widespread destruction to homes and infrastructure.
“In times like these, it is children who suffer first and suffer most,” UNICEF said.
Afghanistan’s children, already facing one of the world’s toughest humanitarian crises, now face further loss of homes, safety, and loved ones.
UNICEF teams are said to be on the ground, working with local partners and UN agencies to respond rapidly to urgent needs. Immediate priorities include life-saving interventions across health, nutrition, safe water, sanitation, child protection, temporary shelter, and psychosocial support.Source: UNICEF
Support from UNICEF and its partners includes deploying mobile health and nutrition teams to treat the injured and screen children for malnutrition. Thousands of cartons of essential nutrition supplies, including ready-to-use therapeutic food, have been dispatched. UNICEF is also distributing water purification tablets and hundreds of family hygiene kits to affected communities.
In addition, UNICEF is providing family tracing and reunification services for unaccompanied and separated children in the area. These efforts aim to protect the most vulnerable children and help them recover from the trauma caused by the earthquake.
“Children have suffered the most in this disaster. We are doing everything possible to save lives and protect children, but urgent help is needed today,” a UNICEF spokesperson voiced.
Earlier, China provided earthquake relief aid to Afghanistan. Bao Xuhui, charge d’affaires at the Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, met with Muhammad Alam Alamyar, general director of administration at the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), to deliver relief contributions from the embassy, Chinese organizations, and the Overseas Chinese Association.
The United Kingdom also committed £1mn ($1.34mn) in emergency assistance for families affected by the quake. This funding is set to be split equally between the UNFPA and the IFRC to deliver urgent humanitarian support to the hardest-hit areas.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres voiced solidarity with Afghanistan, assuring that the UN team would “spare no effort” in aiding those impacted. Multiple UN agencies, including UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, and OCHA, are actively providing emergency relief, medical services, and logistical support on the ground.
The State Energy Institute of Turkmenistan (SEIT) has inaugurated a set of new green facilities designed to promote energy efficiency and sustainability in higher education. The opening ceremony marked the launch of a teaching building, a sports complex, a student dormitory, and a clean energy monument, all of which serve as pilot projects under a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) initiative.
The project, carried out in collaboration with the Ministry of Environmental Protection of Turkmenistan and financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), aims to strengthen national capacity by improving the regulatory environment for energy-efficient and sustainable construction.
The new facilities integrate a wide range of environmentally friendly solutions, including energy-saving technologies, solar installations, and water conservation systems. They are designed not only to reduce consumption and greenhouse gas emissions but also to create a healthier and more comfortable learning environment for students.Source: UNDP Turkmenistan
UNDP played a central role throughout the project, offering technical support and expert guidance from the design stage through construction and commissioning. Together with SEIT scientists and the Institute's Scientific and Production Center for Renewable Energy, UNDP specialists monitored energy and water use during the final stages of construction. The findings confirmed that “green” building standards and innovative technologies had been effectively embedded.
At the ceremony, UNDP awarded SEIT with “Green Certificates,” recognizing the institute's achievements in sustainable construction. The certificates highlight SEIT's adoption of renewable energy solutions, water-saving systems, and reduced energy consumption, while also emphasizing the institute's role in engaging students in sustainable practices and fostering a culture of environmental responsibility.
The initiative builds on earlier cooperation between UNDP and SEIT under the “Sustainable Cities in Turkmenistan: Integrated Green Urban Development in Ashgabat and Awaza” project, which promoted renewable energy use and energy-efficient technologies in urban planning. Both projects align with Turkmenistan's commitments under the Paris Agreement and contribute to advancing the country's national sustainable development goals.
In the long term, SEIT's new facilities are expected to serve as a model for constructing low-energy buildings across Turkmenistan. By strengthening SEIT's expertise in renewable energy and energy efficiency, the project also supports the wider adoption of “green” technologies in the country's construction and energy sectors.
The signing took place during the eighth meeting of the Kazakhstan-China Business Council in Beijing, attended by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The Investment Agreement and the Power Purchase Agreement were signed by Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy and China Energy Engineering Group, underlining the project's high strategic importance.
The new solar power plant will be built in the Sauran district of Turkestan region with an estimated investment of $320mn. Construction is scheduled for 2025–2026.
Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov, who recently held talks with the leadership of Chinese energy corporations, emphasized the project's significance.
"Today's signing is a practical result of our joint work and a symbol of deepening strategic partnership with China in the field of green energy. This project will strengthen our energy system, create new jobs, and will be an important step towards achieving carbon neutrality goals," Akkenzhenov said.
The plant is expected to boost the energy security of southern Kazakhstan, diversify the country's energy mix, and increase the share of renewables in overall power generation.
Officials also note that the initiative will contribute to developing local expertise in renewable technologies and reinforce Kazakhstan's role as a regional leader in the green energy transition.
